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i

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-2(j) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

What statute of limitations, if any, applies to an action brought by a party in

possession of real property to quiet title, to declare a deed, absolute on its face, to be an
equitable mortgage, and to declare a constructive trust in favor of the grantor of the deed?

Standard of Review: The decision as to which statute of limitations applies to
an action is a matter of law. E.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Superior
Court. 166 Ariz. 82, 800 P.2d 585 (1990); see Beck v. Dutchman Coalition
Mines Co.. 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P.2d 867, 871 (1954). In reviewing a trial
court's determination of a question of law, the appellate court reviews the
decision for correctness and affords no deference to the trial court. E.g.. Provo
River Water Users' Assoc, v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993).
B.

Did the filing of a quiet title action by Royal Hunt, who has never been in

possession of the property, cause the applicable statute of limitations to run against Mr.
Conder, who has been in continuous possession of the property and has paid the taxes thereon?

Standard of Review: When the facts are not in dispute, as in the instant case,
the question of whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is
1

one of law. Kittingerv. Boeing Co.. 585 P.2d 812 (Wash. App. 1978). In
reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment, the appellate court views the
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below, and gives no deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).

D.

Where a person moves to intervene in a lawsuit and the motion is not granted, is

that person precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from filing a subsequent lawsuit based on
similar facts?

Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's determination of a question of
law, the appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and affords no
deference to the trial court. E.g.. Provo River Water Users' Assoc, v. Morgan.
857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and ordinances are determinative or of
central importance to this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-26(3) (1953 as amended):
An action may be brought within three years:
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake;
2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 (1953 as amended):
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or
interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to
him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Conder filed the instant action March, 1996, entitled "Complaint to Declare a
Deed a Mortgage, to Quiet Title and Declare the Respective Interests of the Parties," naming
Royal K. Hunt and all other persons claiming by or through Hunt as defendants. The instant
action seeks to have the defendants' interests in the home to be declared an equitable mortgage
or lien for the sums loaned by Hunt; to have such interests released and discharged upon
satisfaction of defendants' claims; and to clear defendants' names off the title to the home.
Defendants Royal Hunt and John Harr (who claims through Hunt) filed three motions
for summary judgment. They asserted two grounds for dismissing Mr. Conder's complaint:
(1) this action is, in effect, a claim against Mr. Hunt for fraud, and therefore is barred by the
statute of limitations for fraud, and (2) this action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata,
because of Mr. Conder's failed attempt to intervene in the Clark, et al. v. Myers, Royal Hunt,
et al. lawsuit. Their motions did not controvert Mr. Conder's allegations in his complaint and,
in fact, relied upon those allegations. (See, e.g.. Hunt's "Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment," dated August 15, 1997, at 3, 4.)
Initially the trial judge denied the motions for summary judgment. Ultimately,
however, the trial judge granted the motions, on two grounds. First, without deciding what
limitations period applies, she ruled that the instant action is barred by the statute of
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limitations. "Plaintiff knew that defendant Hunt claimed ownership of the real property in
question when he was served with the quiet title action filed by defendant Hunt in 1989 in Case
No. 890903329. Therefore, the present action was filed after the applicable statute of
limitations had expired." (Trial Court's "Order," filed April 21, 1998, at 1-2.)
Second, the trial judge ruled that the instant action was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. "Another prior action, Case No. 880907793, presided over by Judge Stirba, was an
action in which this plaintiff sought to intervene in approximately February 1995. At that
time, the plaintiffs proposed Complaint in Intervention raised the same allegations and claims
against defendant Hunt, and sought the same relief which is sought in this action. Therefore,
this action is also barred on the basis of res judicata." (Trial Court's "Order," filed April 21,
1998, at 1-2.)
Believing the foregoing rulings to be errors of law, Mr. Conder filed this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
In 1978, Plaintiff/Appellant Robert Neldon Conder and his wife, Jean, purchased a
home in Sandy, Utah. (Record at 255-256, 262). The home has been Mr. Conder's principal
residence and he has remained in possession of the property from 1978 to the present. (Record
at 262, 264).
For 21 years Conder has paid the taxes, insured the property, maintained and repaired
it and paid the purchase mortgage payments. (Record at 264).
In 1987, nine years after purchase, Conder's home was in foreclosure. Conder went to
Royal K. Hunt, an attorney, for assistance. Hunt provided for a loan to cure the mortgage
4

default. As security, Hunt asked Conder to sign warranty deeds in his favor, which he
recorded. (Record at 256-257, 263). Repayment arrangements for this loan were never
finalized. The loan has not yet been repaid. (Record at 4).
In 1989, to collect his money, Hunt brought a quiet title action against Conder
regarding the subject property styled Hunt v. Robert Conder and Jean Conder. Civil No. 890903329,in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. (Record at 311). Conder remained
in possession of the property. (Record at 264).
The Hunt quiet title action was ultimately dismissed, and the issues brought by Hunt
under the quiet title action were never litigated. (Record at 5, 264).
In 1990, Hunt filed the first of two bankruptcies in which no claim of ownership to this
home was made. It wasn't even listed as an asset. In 1992, Hunt filed his second bankruptcy,
again failing to list the home as an asset or claiming ownership. (Record at 257, 268-272).
By 1994, Hunt's creditors were coming after Conder's home. In November, he was
served with a notice of execution in Clark, et al. v. Myers, Royal Hunt, et al.. Civil No. 880907793. (Record at 266). In 1995, to protect his interest, Conder filed a motion for a stay of
execution and to intervene. (Record at 266). Mr. Conder's proposed complaint in
intervention sought to establish his ownership of the property and the right to pay the
mortgage. (Record at 268-272).
Judge Stirba, who presided over the case, denied Conder's motion to intervene.
(Record at 307). About 2xh weeks later on February 27, 1995, she signed a formal Order
which denied Conder's motion to stay execution but which was silent as to Conder's Motion to
Intervene. (Record at 200-201). Over a year later, Conder again tried to intervene in the
5

matter. In December 1996, Judge Stirba denied the motion, stating: "The Court declines to
reach Robert Conder's Motion to Intervene, having previously denied said motion and no
appeal having been taken therefrom." (Record at 204-205).
Since Conder was not permitted to intervene to protect his ownership interest, and since
Hunt's claims still encumbered Conder's home, he commenced this quiet title action March 29,
1996. It seeks to have the warranty deeds executed by him and his ex-wife in favor of Hunt
declared mortgages. (Record at 1). Conder named all other persons claiming by or through
Hunt as defendants. Hunt and Defendant John Harr (who claims through Hunt) filed five
substantially similar motions for summary judgment in which they argued that Mr. Conder's
action was barred by the three year statute of limitations for fraud and by res judicata because
of Mr. Conder's failed attempt to intervene in Clark, et al. v. Myers, Royal Hunt, et al.
(Record at 17, 40, 220, 253, 301).
Ultimately, the trial judge granted Hunt's motion on two grounds. Her signed order
states:
Plaintiff [Conder] knew that Defendant Hunt claimed ownership of the real
property in question when he was served with the quiet title action filed by
defendant Hunt in 1989 in Case No. 890903329. Therefore, the present action
was filed after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.
Another prior action, Case No. 880907793, presided over by Judge Stirba, was
an action in which this plaintiff sought to intervene in approximately February
1995. At that time, the plaintiff's proposed Complaint in Intervention raised the
same allegations and claims against defendant Hunt, and sought the same relief
which is sought in this action. Therefore, this action is also barred on the basis
of res judicata."
(Record at 347-349).

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Conder has owned and possessed his Sandy home for 21 years. He has paid taxes,
insured the property, maintained the home, and paid the mortgage. At no point in time has
Conder lost the property through foreclosure, execution or quiet title. His exclusive ownership
and enjoyment of the property has been clouded by a 1987 deed and individuals claiming by,
through or under that deed. Since Conder has enjoyed continuous possession, his right to quiet
title cannot be barred by statutes of limitations until Conder is removed from possession. No
action concerning the property to which Conder is not a party and to which he is not permitted
to intervene can serve to barr his right to quiet title under the doctrine of res judicata.

ARGUMENT
I

No Statute of Limitations Runs Against a Party in Possession.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no issues of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In reviewing a trial court's granting of a summary judgment motion, courts must
liberally view all evidence "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."
Smurthwaite v. Painter. 755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah App. 1988) citing Oberhanslv v. Sprouse,
751 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah App. 1988). The court reviews the trial court's conclusions of
law for correctness, with no deference accorded to the legal conclusions of the lower court.
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie
Power & Water. Inc.. 789 P.2d 24 (Utah, 1990); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield
County. 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991).
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Hunt argued in the trial court that Conder's complaint to quiet the title of his home and
residence has been barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26 (1953 as amended), the statute of
limitations governing fraud. The trial court concurred that a statute of limitations barred
Conder's complaint to quiet the title to his residence, and, without outlining the specific statute
which functioned to bar Conder's complaint, dismissed the complaint pursuant to Hunt's
motions for summary judgment.
The trial court erred in finding the "applicable" statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs
action to quiet the title of his home and residence. In that Conder remained in possession of
the subject property, no statute of limitations applies to bar Conder's quiet title action.
As a general rule, courts hold that statutes of limitation do not apply to bar an action to
quiet title in the property when a plaintiff is in possession of the property that is the subject of
the dispute.
Generally, the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one
who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the
plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be
owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee
continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has
a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in
his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right.
65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims § 55; see also Muktarian
v. Barmbv. 63 Cal. 2d 558, 407 P.2d 659 (Ca. 1965); Anaconda v. Walker-Smith. 44 Cal.
App. 4th 610; 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Cal. App. 1996); Lichtv v. Sickels. 149 Cal. App. 3d 696,
197 Cal. Rptr. 137 (Ca. App. 1983); Viersen v. Boettcher. 387 P.2d 133 (Okl. 1963); Riddick
v. Streett. 858 S.W. 2d 62 (Ark. 1993).
8

In 1978, the Utah Supreme Court followed the general rule when it considered the issue
of how possession affects the applicability of statutes of limitations in quiet title actions.
Rodgers v. Hansen. 580 P.2d 233 (Utah 1978). In Rodgers. Mr. and Mrs. Neil, parents of the
parties, entered into a contract to purchase real property. Defendants Mrs. and Mr. Hansen,
daughter and son-in-law to the Neils, agreed to make the down payment on the property on
behalf of the Neils. Mr. Neil died, and the Hansens subsequently paid the full purchase price
of the property on behalf of Mrs. Neil. The property was deeded to Mrs. Neil and the
Hansens as joint tenants.
Mrs. Neil retained a life estate in the property, retained all income generated from the
property, and paid all taxes and upkeep expenses therefor. She also made periodic payments to
the Hansens for the subject property in an effort to reimburse the Hansens for the money they
paid on her behalf.
In 1958, Mrs. Neil had a disagreement with the Hansens, and quit claimed her interest
in the property to her daughter Plaintiff Shirley Rodgers. This was done in an attempt to sever
the joint tenancy between Mrs. Neil and the Hansens, and to allow Mrs. Neil's other children
to divide her one-third share of the property as a tenant in common upon Mrs. Neil's death.
Mrs. Neil passed away in 1975 and Rodgers brought suit to quiet title in the property and
declare the deed an equitable mortgage less than one month from the date of Mrs. Neil's death.
The Court considered the issue as to whether the dispute in 1958 caused any statute of
limitations to begin to run as of the date of the dispute against any claims regarding the subject
property. It held Mrs. Neil's continuous possession of the property prevented any statute of
limitations from commencing to run until possession by Mrs. Neil ended at her death. The
9

Court so held, despite the fact that Mrs. Neil knew of the conflict between her daughters
regarding the ownership of the property for seventeen years prior to her death.
Nor is plaintiffs claim defeated by either a limitation statute or laches.
Although it was known that there was a dispute as to respective interests in the
property as early as 1958, Mrs. Neil had continuous possession of the property.
The burden on Mrs. Neil to initiate legal action can be no greater than the
burden on the Hansens to establish their claim to the property. The action was
timely filed by Mrs. Neil's successor in interest when possession was lost at the
death of Mrs. Neil.
Rodgers v. Hansen. 580 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1978).
The holding in Rodgers is directly applicable to the present action. Conder entered into
a security agreement with Hunt with a deed in the subject real property securing the loan.
Conder remained in continuous possession of the property, and paid all taxes and managed all
upkeep. Condor later filed an action to quiet title and to declare his deed to Hunt a mortgage.
Because he remained in possession, no statute of limitations commenced against his quiet title
action. Conder may have known of a potential conflict with Hunt regarding the property in
that he brought suit to quiet title of the property. However, the suit was dismissed because of
the failure of Hunt to prosecute the matter.
Other jurisdictions follow this rule. California has a strong line of authority that
outlines the principles and underlying reasoning for the general rule regarding possession.
Nobantu Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith. 44 Cal. App 4th 610, 615, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 42-43
(Cal. App. 1996); Lichtv v. Sickels. 149 Cal. App. 3d 696 (Ca. App. 1983); Oates v. Nelson.
269 Cal. App. 2d 18 (Ca. App. 1969); citing Muktarian v. Barmbv. 407 P.2d 659 (Cal. 1965).
The rule and rationale are clearly and particularly outlined in the case of Muktarian v. Barmby,
407 P.2d 659 (Cal. 1965).
10

In Muktarian, a father retained a life estate in his property and deeded the property to
his son, subject to the father's life interest. The purpose of the conveyance was to prevent the
property from passing to the father's second wife upon the father's death. The father retained
possession of the property and continued to pay taxes on the property, but never moved to
correct certain mistakes in the deed. Upon his suit to quiet title of the property to himself, the
court held that no statute of limitations applied to him, as a party in continuous possession.
Since there is no statute of limitations governing quiet title actions as such, it is
ordinarily necessary to refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine
which statute applies. [Citations omitted.] In the present case, however, it is
unnecessary to determine which statute would otherwise apply, for no statute of
limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title while he is in possession
of the property. [Citations omitted.]
Muktarian. 407 P.2d at 661.
The Muktarian court so held because many parties who are in actual possession of real
property are often unaware of any dormant adverse claims by parties who are not in
possession. Muktarian, 407 P.2d at 661. Furthermore even when the party who is in
possession of the property is aware that there may be potential claims, Muktarian reasons that
"there is no reason to put him to the expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim
is pressed against him." IcL
As in Muktarian, Conder remained in continuous possession of the subject property,
and, while in possession, paid all the property taxes, paid the mortgage payments and made
improvements to the property. Hunt filed a quiet title action against Conder in 1989 regarding
the property; however, the 1989 action was subsequently dismissed based on Hunt's failure to
prosecute the action. The issues regarding the rightful ownership of the property were not
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litigated in the 1989 Hunt action.
Prior to the commencement of Hunt's quiet title action and subsequent to its dismissal,
both Conder and Hunt evidenced their understanding that Conder was the actual owner of the
property. Hunt filed two petitions in bankruptcy without listing the subject property as an
asset of his estate. Conder also filed bankruptcy and listed the home as an asset and the loan
from Hunt as being secured by the property. Hunt did not attempt to oust Conder from the
property, nor did Hunt assume and pay the taxes on the property or attempt to improve or
maintain the property. Conder assumed all ownership rights and responsibilities that the
subject property afforded and required.
Conder had no obligation to put himself to the "expense and inconvenience of
litigation" after the quiet title action was dismissed. Even if the 1989 action put Conder on
notice that there may be problems with the title to the property, such would not require Conder
to immediately pursue a cause of action to quiet title, or to lose the right to do so by a statute
of limitations. Rodgers, 580 P.2d at 235; Muktarian, 407 P.2d at 661; see also Riddick v.
Streett, 353 S.W. 2d 62, 64 (Ark. 1993)(Even if cloud in existence and within the knowledge
of the possessor for more than seven years, statute of limitations does not prohibit a person in
possession from suing to remove the cloud) citing Dotson v. Aldridge. 246 Ark. 456, 438
S.W. 2d 464 (1969).
In Idaho, the Supreme Court applied the principle that statutes of limitation are not
applicable in quiet title actions relating to void tax deeds that are brought by the party in
possession. Instead, an owner in possession should have a continuing right to proceed to quiet
the title in his property, despite the time that passes prior to commencement of the action.
12

"When void tax deeds are attempted to be made prima facie evidence of the
regularity of the proceedings, equity will interfere to permit removal as a cloud
on title, Rich v. Braxton, 158 U.S. 375, 15 S. Ct. 1006, 39 L. Ed. 1022; other
cites omitted, which right may be invoked by the owner in possession at any
time as "such a right is never barred by the statute of limitations. It is a
continuing right which exists as long as there is an occasion for its exercise."
Ford v. Clenendin, 215 N.Y 10, 16, 109 N.E. 124, 126."
Argvle v. Slemaker, 585 P.2d 954, 958 (Id. 1978) emphasis added, citing Cameron Estates v.
Peering. 123 N.E. 2d 621, 624 (N.Y. 1954) other citations omitted.
In Oklahoma and Arkansas, the courts have also followed the general rule that
possession of property prevents any statute of limitations from precluding the party from acting
to quiet the title of the property. Viersen v. Boettcher. 387 P.2d 133 (Okl. 1963); Woods v.
Phillips Petroleum Co.. 251 P.2d 505 (Okl. 1952); Alfrev v. Richardson. 231 P.2d 363 (Okl.
1951); Riddick v. Streett. 313 Ark. 706; 858 S.W. 2d 62 (Ark. 1993); Dotson v. Aldridee.
246 Ark. 456; 438 S.W. 2d 464 (Ark. 1969).
Condor retained possession of his property since its purchase in 1978. He executed a
deed to Hunt as a mortgage on the property and not as an outright conveyance. Condor was
made aware of a potential problem with the title when Hunt filed a quiet title action in 1989;
however, the action was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Hunt failed to again pursue any
quiet title action. Until Condor's possession is interrupted or terminated, no statute of
limitations applies to his continual right to determine the title of his property. Therefore,
summary judgment was granted in error.
II.

Actions to Quiet Title are not Bound by Statutes of Limitation
Summary judgment was also inappropriate because actions to quiet title to real
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property are not generally bound by statutes of limitations. "Statutes of limitations are rarely
in terms applicable to suits to quiet title and to remove cloud on title and to statutory
proceedings for the trial of title." Restatement, Property Actions of Ejectment, Suits to Quiet
Tile and Similar Proceedings §222.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Davidsen v. Salt Lake City. 81 P.2d
374 (Utah 1938). In 1922, Davidsen tendered a signed deed for a right-of-way across his
property to Salt Lake City contingent upon Salt Lake City making improvements to his
property. Salt Lake City accepted the deed and, apparently without knowledge of the
conditions requested, recorded the deed. In 1923, Salt Lake City informed Davidsen that it did
not intend to honor the conditions requested by Davidsen.
Davidson filed suit against Salt Lake City in 1927, four years after he was informed
that Salt Lake City had denied his request. Davidsen asserted that Salt Lake City had obtained
the deed through fraud. He petitioned the court to deem illegal the deed that conveyed a rightof-way across his property.
In following the general rule, the Supreme Court held that actions where the plaintiff
seeks nothing but to quiet the title of real property are not barred by any statute of limitations.
Davidsen v. Salt Lake City. 81 P.2d 374, 376 (Utah 1938). citing Branting v Salt Lake City.
153 P. 995, 1001 (Utah 1915). The Court then outlined an exception to the rule in cases
where a party is seeking affirmative relief from the court distinct from simply removing the
cloud from the title. Id. The Davidsen court determined that Davidsen's action was not a
simple quiet title action, but that it also sought affirmative relief, in that Davidsen was not in
possession of the property in question, that he conceded a statute of limitations applied to the
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action, and that he had specifically moved the court to cancel the deed because of the
fraudulent actions of Salt Lake City. Therefore, the Court determined that the action was
governed by the statute of limitations governing fraud, and dismissed the action pursuant to the
statute of limitations. Id.
Conder's cause of action to quiet the title to the subject real property is distinguishable
from the action in Davidsen v. Salt Lake City. Unlike Davidsen, Conder did not seek the
affirmative relief of being restored to the possession of his home and real property. Conder
has also not asserted nor has he conceded that any statute of limitations applies to the present
action. Further, Conder has not alleged, nor is his cause of action based upon, allegations of
fraud.1 Conder has simply requested that this court quiet the title to his real property.
The Utah Supreme Court again considered the applicability of statutes of limitation to
quiet title actions in 1978. It did so in Rodgers v. Hansen. 508 P.2d 235 (Utah 1978). The
case relied upon in Argument I. See outline of facts, supra. In Rodgers. the Supreme Court
determined that a party who sought to quiet title and to declare a deed an equitable mortgage
was not bound by any statute of limitations. Rodgers v. Hansen. 580 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah

1

The trial court did not specify the statute of limitations it considered when
granting summary judgment against Conder; however Hunt motions for summary judgment
arrgued that Conder's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations governing actions on
fraud, in that it was allegedly fraught with allegations that Hunt had "made false representations,
engaged in fraudulent activity,fraudulentlyfailed to list or disclosed [sic] information regarding
the property at issue herein in his bankruptcy proceedings, etc." However, nowhere in Conder's
complaint does Conder assert that Hunt acted fraudulently in his actions toward Condor.
Further, Conder has not satisfied any of the criteria to establish a valid cause of action
under fraud, pursuant to Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-1067 (Utah
1996).
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1978). This holding is not in conflict with the Davidsen holding. Rodgers does not seek the
affirmative relief of restoring possession of the property to the moving party, nor did she
concede that a statute of limitations applied.
Other states have also decided this issue. In Washington, the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have repeatedly held that quiet title actions, even if seeking affirmative relief
such as fraud, are not barred by any statute of limitations where the gravamen of the action is
to quiet title. Petersen v. Schafer. 709 P.2d 813 (Wash. App. 1985) at 815, citing Van Sant v.
Seattle. 287 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1955); Inland Empire Co. v. Grant Cv.. 245 P. 14 (Wash.
1926); Wagner v. Law. 28 P. 1109 (Wash. 1892); Bradbury v. Nethercutt. 164 P. 194 (Wash.
1917).
Conder is seeking to quiet the title to his real property and to declare a deed an
equitable mortgage. The gravamen or core of Conder's action, as in Rodgers. is to quiet the
title to his residence. He is not trying to assert fraud or anything else. No statute of
limitation should apply to quiet title actions regarding real property when, as in the present
matter, the "gravamen" of the suit is to quiet title.
III.

A Person Who Unsuccessfully Moves to Intervene Is Not Subject to the Doctrine of
Res Judicata
Summary judgment was granted inappropriately, because the court erred in holding

that, as a matter of law, res judicata precluded Conder's quiet title action. The doctrine of res
judicata, which to some may seem as dry as day-old toast, is intended to prevent claims or
issues once litigated from being relitigated. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d
873, 874-75 (Utah 1983). Technically speaking, res judicata has two branches: "claim
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preclusion," which prevents relitigation of the same claims for relief or causes of action
between the same parties, and "issue preclusion," also known as collateral estoppel, which
prevents relitigation of issues that have been decided, though the claims for relief are not the
same. E ^ , icL at 875; State in Interest of T.J.. 945 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah App. 1997).
Sometimes a court may not observe this distinction and may use the term "res judicata"
synonymously with the term "claim preclusion." See, e ^ , Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337,
1340 (Utah 1983). This appears to have happened in the instant case, as indicated by the trial
court's statement that "res judicata" bars this action because it raises the same "allegations and
claims" as were raised in Conder's proposed complaint in intervention in the action before
Judge Stirba. For the sake of simplicity and consistency, this memorandum will also use the
term "res judicata" synonymously with the term "claim preclusion."
Res judicata has three elements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been one presented in the first suit
or must be one that could and should have been raised. Third, the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. fMadsen v. Borthwick,
769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added).]
In the instant case, not one of these elements is satisfied. First, Conder was never a
party to the prior case. A person who unsuccessfully moves to intervene does not become a
"party" to the litigation and hence is not bound by the judgment. First Wisconsin Mortgage
Trustv. Wvman's. Inc.. 428 A.2d 119, 1124 (Vt. 1981) ("An unsuccessful motion to
intervene does not operate to bind the movant to the judgment"); 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 659 at 77-78 (1995) ("A party denied intervention is not bound by res judicata or collateral
estoppel rules, unless he or she is thereafter represented by one who is a party"); 50 C.J.S.
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Judgment § 856 (1997) ("[A] person whose application [to intervene] is denied . . . is not
bound by the judgment"); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 34, Reporter's Notes,
comment b (same)2
For example, in Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Linthicum, 930 F.2d 14
(8th Cir. 1991), Provident unsuccessfully sought to intervene to assert subrogation claims in a
state court lawsuit brought by the Linthicums. Thereafter, Provident filed a federal action
against the Linthicums in which it again sought subrogation. The Linthicums argued that
Provident was barred by res judicata from bringing the federal court action. The Eight Circuit
disagreed, stating: "The district court correctly held that Provident was not bound by the prior
state court order because Provident had been denied leave to intervene in the state lawsuit and
thus it was not a party to those proceedings." Id at 16 (emphasis added).
It matters not whether the person who moved to intervene failed to appeal. For
example, in Tobin v. McClellan. 75 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 1947), Ms. Tobin petitioned to be made
a party to the action. The petition was denied, but no appeal was taken. The court held that,
despite her failure to appeal, Ms. Tobin was not bound by the judgment in the action. Id, at
150. In the instant case, it does not appear that Conder could have appealed the denial of his
motion to intervene, because although Judge Stirba's unsigned minute entry (which was not
appealable) stated that the motion to intervene was denied, her signed Order did not mention

2

In a similar vein, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the mere right to intervene, of
itself, does not subject a person possessing that right to the doctrine of res judicata. Searle
Brothers v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978) ("The right to intervene in an action does
not, in the absence of its exercise, subject one possessing it to Ihe risk of being bound by the
result of the litigation, under the doctrine of res judicata.")
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such denial.
To support the position, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 338 F.2d 906
(8th Cir. 1964) is cited, which is distinguishable because it involved a unique situation very
different than the instant case. In Cheyenne, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (the "Tribe")
agreed to convey certain lands to the United States (the "government") so that a reservoir
could be constructed thereon. The agreement was formalized by an Act of Congress, which
was ratified by three-fourths of the Tribe's members. Among other things, the Act created a
large fund from which the Tribe would pay individual Tribal members the appraised value of
their land being conveyed to the government; permitted individual Tribal members to reject the
appraisal of their land; and empowered the government to hold a condemnation hearing to
determine the value of such a member's land.
The government held a condemnation proceeding that resulted in a $10,000 judgment
against the government. Thereafter, the Tribe unsuccessfully moved to intervene, and then
filed a petition to vacate the judgment. The objections which the Tribe proposed to file "raised
matters substantially the same as were presented in the Government's objections." Id. at 908.
Without considering the three-part test for res judicata, the court held that because the Tribe's
motion to intervene had been denied, and the Tribe had not appealed the denial, res judicata
barred the Tribe from further litigating these issues. In ruling against the Tribe, the court held
that the interests of the Tribe were adequately represented by the government because: (1) a
guardian-ward relationship existed between the government and the Tribe (idL at 909); (2) the
Tribe had agreed in "unequivocal language" upon the procedure to be followed if an individual
member of the Tribe rejected the appraisal (idL at 910); and (3) by so agreeing, the Tribe had
19

"agreed that the Government was capable of representing its interest." IdL
In the instant case, unlike Cheyenne, it cannot be said that. Hunt adequately represented
Conder's interests, which were adverse to Hunt's interests. Furthermore, the issues litigated
by Hunt in the Judge Stirba lawsuit were completely different than the ones Conder sought to
raise in his complaint in intervention and now seeks to litigate.
As to the second element of res judicata, it cannot be said in this case that Conder's
claims were ever "presented" in the Judge Stirba lawsuit. No party to the suit had an interest
similar to Conder's. No evidence has been provided that his interests were represented in any
fashion. In fact, Condor was repeatedly denied the opportunity to join in the suit and represent
his interests.
Third, the mere denial of a motion to intervene is ordinarily not a final judgment "on
the merits" of the proposed claims. For example, in Saunders v. Bankston, 506 P.2d 1253
(Colo. App. 1972), a Ms. Saunders sought to intervene as a defendant in an action brought by
the Bankstons. Along with her motion, she tendered a proposed answer and counterclaim.
After her motion to intervene was denied, she filed suit against the Bankstons, alleging the
same claims. The court of appeals held that the second suit was not barred by the doctrine of
res judicata, stating: "[T]he [trial] court's denial of the intervention was not a adjudication on
the merits. Accordingly, the claims which plaintiff asserts in the present action are not barred
by the prior action." IcL (emphasis added).
In the instant case, there is nothing in the trial court's Order to indicate that Judge
Stirba reached the merits of Conder's proposed claims, only that she denied his motion to
intervene.
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CONCLUSION
(INCLUDE RELIEF SOUGHT)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Conder has never had a day in court to defend the home he's lived in, paid taxes on,
maintained, and insured for 21 years. His quiet title action to preserve and protect that
ownership was dismissed as time barred and already litigated. That decision was improper.
The trial court should be reversed.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statutes of limitations serve to prevent stale claims. They should not be used as swords
to defeat Conder's ownership interest by requiring Conder to take affirmative action to protect
his own home. He has always been in possession of the property and should always be
permitted to quiet title to that property while in possession. No statute should begin to run
until after he has been removed from possession. The decision of the trial court should be
reversed.

RES JUDICATA
Although the doctrine of res judicata may be "dry as toast" to some, to a person in Mr.
Conder's position, about to lose his home, it is of great interest. This Court should take an
interest in it as well, because the trial judge's decision was contrary to the law. Not one of the
elements of res judicata is satisfied: (1) Mr. Conder was never a party to the prior lawsuit; (2)
he was not allowed to present his claims in that lawsuit; and (3) his claims in that lawsuit were
21

DATED this ^_ day of May, 1999.
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

Richard C. Terry

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing, postage
prepaid to the following at the addresses indicated below.
Attorneys for Appellant
Richard C. Terry
Corbridge Baird & Christensen
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for the Appellee Royal Hunt
Larry L. Whyte
380 North 200 West, Suite 260
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Appellee John Harr, Sr.
Randy M. Lish
McCULLOUGH JONES & IVINS
853 W. Center Street
Orem, Utah 84058

Larry R. Vonwald, pro se
2535 Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093

DATED this Jf_ day of May, 1999

^-Richard C. Terry
Counsel for Appellant/Plaintiff

22

ADDENDUM

• +*V f ~ -

Third Judicial D!-*;-.'c;

APR 2 1 1998

LARRY L. WHYTE #4942
380 North 200 West, Suite 260
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 801-298-7200
Attorney for Defendant
Royal K. Hunt

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT NELDON CONDER,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 960902150QT

vs.
ROYAL K. HUNT, et al.,

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendants.
Defendant Hunt's and Defendants Harrs' renewed Motion(s) for
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on March 2, 1998
before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler. Larry L. Whyte appeared on
behalf of Defendant Hunt, Randy M. Lish appeared on behalf of the
Harr Defendants and Plaintiff Robert N. Conder was present and was
represented by Paul A. Kirk.

The Court having reviewed the

pleadings and memoranda on file herein, as well as the pleadings
filed in Third District Court Case No. 890903329, and being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

Plaintiff knew that defendant Hunt claimed ownership of

the real property in question when he was served with the quiet

title action filed by defendant hunt in 1989 in Case No. 890903329.
Therefore, the present action was filed after the applicable
statute of limitations had expired.
3.

Another prior action, Case No. 880907793, presided over

by Judge Stirba, was an action in which this plaintiff sought to
intervene as a party in approximately February 1995. At that time,
the plaintiff's proposed Complaint in Intervention raised the same
allegations and claims against defendant Hunt, and sought the same
relief which is sought in this action.

Therefore, this action is

also barred on the basis of res judicata.

DATED this £<2.d a Y o f

Aft^yyjf , 1998.

BY THE COURT:

S,ANDRA N. PEULER \
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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